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AbstrAct: Anthropogenic climate change is expected to have serious socioeco-
logical consequences around the globe, in particular for wetland areas. That is the 
case of the Pantanal, a large tropical wetland located in the Upper Paraguay River 
Basin (UPRB), in the centre of South America, where a range of responses are being 
devised to cope with the negative impacts of climate change. After a review of the 
most common approaches discussed in the literature, the results of an empirical 
study conducted in Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay are presented. The research attested 
that most responses have so far evolved around the principles of systematic adapta-
tion (e.g. technology amelioration) and climate scepticism (e.g. postponement of 
responses) and, more recently, under the influence of marketisation measures (e.g. 
carbon trading). However, there is also growing enthusiasm, particularly in Bolivia, 
for the inclusion of initiatives associated with the architecture of entitlements (e.g. 
improved access to resources) and climate justice (e.g. compensation for the negative 
impacts of conventional development). Two important factors that seem to under-
mine the efficacy of the responses to climate change in the region: the hegemonic 
influence of the agribusiness sector and the relatively low importance of the UPRB 
for national and trilateral environmental policy-making.
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Anthropogenic climate change represents one of the most chal-
lenging, complex and contested problems faced by the international 
community today. The contemporary concerns about human made 
climate change also offer a unique entry point into the preparedness 
of public and private responses to global environmental problems. For 
instance, the multilateral negotiations on the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reflect the failures of tech-
nical assessments, the intricacy of international relations and the short-
comings of conventional environmental management. Particularly the 
embeddedness of the carbon economy in contemporary society means 
that the climate change controversy is at once a problem of environment, 
economy and human rights (Haines & Reichman, 2008).
The global interlinkages of the climate mean that no region in the 
planet is likely to be spared of the consequences of anthropogenic global 
warming, even areas that are located relatively distant from the main 
economic and industrial centres, such as the South American Pantanal. 
The Pantanal is a large floodplain wetland in the centre of the Upper 
Paraguay River Basin (UPRB), which has a total area of around 360,000 
km2 (see Figure 1). The Pantanal spreads for about 140,000 km2 is shared 
between Brazil (80 percent of the Pantanal area), Bolivia (19 percent) and 
Paraguay (1 percent). The rainy season in the region begins between Sep-
tember and December, increases between January and March, and then 
promotes a flood wave movement from the north through the south Pan-
tanal that inundates as much as 70 percent of the floodplain until July 
(Hamilton et al., 2002). Significant portions of the Pantanal floodplain are 
submerged from four to eight months each year by water depths from a 
few centimetres to more than two meters (PCBAP, 1997). The Pantanal 
functions as a large reservoir that stores water from the surrounding 
plateaus during the rainy season and then delivers it slowly to the lower 
sections of the Paraguay River. As a result, any significant change in the 
rainfall pattern is likely to have major impacts on the local ecology and 
socioeconomic relations. 
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Figure 1 - The Upper Paraguay River Basin (UPRB) and the location of the 
Pantanal wetland
At the 8th INTECOL (International Wetlands Conference), which 
was held in the Pantanal region in July 2008 – more exactly, in the city 
of Cuiabá – it became clear that, although wetlands (including marshes, 
peat bogs, swamps, river deltas, mangroves, tundra, lagoons and river 
floodplains) only cover a relatively small percentage of the planet’s 
surface, they actually contain a large proportion of the world’s carbon 
stored in terrestrial soil reservoirs (Kayranli et al., 2010). That means a 
major contribution regarding the balance of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
in the atmosphere and underscores the importance of wetland conser-
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vation. Beyond carbon storage, wetlands provide a range of environ-
mental services, including water filtration and storage, erosion control, 
buffer against flooding, nutrient recycling, biodiversity maintenance, 
and nursery for fisheries. In the same event, the Pantanal has been rec-
ognised as one of the most important tropical wetlands in the world 
and it had been officially designated a Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO 
in 2000. The local ecosystems comprise a complex biodiversity mosaic 
with influences from the Amazon, Cerrado and Chaco biomes (PCBAP, 
1997). Nonetheless, the Pantanal is also one of the most threatened socio-
ecological systems in the planet, especially due to pollution, loss of bio-
diversity, high sedimentation, modification of natural cycles, large-scale 
projects, the lack of conservation units and the impacts of anthropogenic 
climate change (Swarts, 2000).The tension between available resources 
and economic growth has resulted in recurrent calls for ecological pro-
tection and the conservation of ecological systems (Ioris, 2004), but there 
are major disagreements about the most adequate environmental man-
agement and regional development policies (Neves, 2009).
The majority of the economic pressures and development conflicts 
have occurred in the Brazilian section of the Pantanal region, where 
the ecosystems have been impacted by uncontrolled urban and agro-
industrial expansion in the surrounding plateaus, as well as to the 
intensification of agriculture production, tourism and recreation activi-
ties, and the use of agrochemicals within the floodplain itself (Alho et 
al ., 1988). Native vegetation has been increasingly removed to make 
space for artificial pastures, which occurred together with other prob-
lems such as illegal hunting, unsustainable tourism and the use of fire 
as an (unlawful) land management technique. Due to the introduction 
of exotic pastures, the Pantanal floodplain has lost already 17 percent 
of its original vegetation (Harris et al., 2005) and between 2002 and 2008 
the rate of deforestation (713 km2/year) was proportionally higher than 
in the Amazon region (statistics from Deter/INPE, published by Brasil, 
2010). In addition, around 115 new hydropower schemes are under con-
struction or being planned in the Brazilian side of the UPRB, though the 
local and the cumulative impacts of such structures are still not properly 
understood. However, there are some preliminary evidences of serious 
disruption caused by the operation of hydropower dams (Zeilhofer & 
Moura, 2009). All those pressures lead Junk & Cunha (2005, p. 392) to 
declare the Pantanal at a crossroads, in the sense that “increasing eco-
nomic and political pressure requires fundamental decisions to be made 
in the near future.” 
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The above challenges have been magnified by the likelihood of dis-
turbances in the regional climate due to global warming. The scientific 
community has actually identified a series of potential consequences that 
are going to follow climate change in South America, which includes the 
salinisation and desertification of agriculture land, the savanisation of 
forested areas and a reduced availability of water (IPCC, 2007). Marengo 
et al. (2010) produced future scenarios of climatic change with the use of 
three regional climate models (HadRM3P, Eta CCS and RegCM3) and 
indicate a trend of reduction in precipitation (according to one model) 
and high probability of increase in temperature through the whole year 
(according to the three models) in the central region of Brazil. Marengo 
et al. (2012) have also estimated likely changes to the La Plata River 
Basin (which contains the UPRB) between 2011-2040 and an increase of 
1.8oC in the annual temperature (1.2oC in the summer and 1.8oC in the 
winter) and a reduction in annual rainfall of 2.1 percent (-0.7 percent  in 
the summer and -11.9 percent in the winter, which is the dry season). 
However, these results seem to contradict the tendency of higher flows 
in the Paraguay basin since the 1970s (Collischonn et al., 2001), and the 
expected increase in soil erosion in some areas of the Pantanal due to 
rainfall changes (Querner et al., 2005).
More important than the disagreement among hydrologists and cli-
matologists about the course of environmental impacts, climate change 
is expected to aggravate existing shortcomings in the access, use and con-
servation of natural resources, as well as to further challenge the already 
hesitant environmental policies and regulatory enforcement in the three 
countries. To understand these even more perverse consequences of 
climate change, it is important to briefly revisit recent economic devel-
opment and the evolving relations of production in the region (Barkin, 
2009). The conversion of the uplands into large plantation farms in the 
Brazilian section of the UPRB commenced in the 1960s with the expan-
sion of the agriculture frontier, which was fuelled by heavy subsidies 
and federal government investments in technology and infrastructure 
(railways, roads and grain storage capacity). Government agencies were 
responsible for providing credit, conducting agronomic research and 
disseminating technologies through rural extension. Large landowners 
were the main beneficiaries of economic development, at the expense of 
the demands of low-income, disenfranchised social groups (Ioris, 2012). 
Such an expansionist process continued in the following decades, but 
since the neoliberal reforms of the Brazilian State in the 1990s it observed 
a more market-oriented approach and the consolidation of the agribusi-
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ness sector in the plateaus that surround the Pantanal. The growth of 
agribusiness has reinforced a dualistic model of development that 
favours plantation farmers and modern cattle ranchers and discrimi-
nates against the majority of the rural and urban population (Rossetto, 
2004). The adoption of capital intensive agriculture in recent years never 
affected the overarching pattern of inequality, but has merely led to the 
fragmentation of the old farms and the reconcentration of land in the 
hands of newcomers (Araújo, 2006). 
What is important for the purpose of this paper is that, without 
fundamental reforms in the structure of production and without more 
inclusive public policies, there is a serious risk that the impending con-
sequences of climate change will unevenly affect different social groups, 
both aggravating the hardship already experienced by low-income sec-
tors and siphoning the results of adaptation and mitigation measures 
to those who benefit more from current economic trends. In order to go 
beyond narrow development and conservation debates, it is necessary to 
account for a range of highly politicised issues at the intersection between 
interpersonal relations and socioeconomic pressures (Ioris, 2013). When-
ever the responses to climate change are formulated according to the 
demands of agribusiness and other hegemonic sectors, these may help 
to mitigate climate change at the regional scale, but are also expected 
to produce socioeconomic distortions and result in additional socioeco-
logical risks. For instance, deprived communities are more likely to live 
in unsafe areas along the river courses, have more difficulty to adapt 
to a changing environment and fewer opportunities to influence gov-
ernmental decisions (even when formal channels of consultation and 
participation exist, such as catchment committees and park advisory 
councils). Despite the obvious complexity of climate change issues, so 
far most of the public debate in the region has remained too focused 
on the physical consequences of climatic alterations and has dedicated 
less attention to the underlying social inequalities that magnify nega-
tive impacts and prevent the formulation of fair mitigation measures. 
Official publications in particular tend to concentrate on legal, adminis-
trative and technological issues, but fail to acknowledge the profound, 
politicised interconnections between development pressures and socio-
natural relations (e.g. in Paraguay by the Secretariat of the Environment 
[SEAM], n/d, and in Brazil by the Strategic Issues Nucleus [NAE], 2005).
Ostrom (2012) observes that the conventional explanation of the 
sources of climate change is largely confined to the uncontrolled out-
comes of economic development, lack of scientific information and 
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an inadequate environmental regulation, but without sufficiently 
addressing the also important socio-political and institutional issues. 
Following her advice, this paper aims to review, from a critical social 
sciences perspective, the pillars of main responses to climate change and 
the concrete experience in the UPRB. The next pages will contend that 
most of the current approaches have combined, not always in a coherent 
fashion, different elements of the international policy framework. The 
different responses identified through the research reflect contrasting 
rationalities of environmental conservation, social inclusion and the 
mitigation of climatic risks. Our discussion is based on research carried 
out in 2010-2012, which included 45 interviews with government offi-
cials (8 interviews), civil society representatives (12), academics (10) and 
business sectors (15), as well as the analysis of policies and documen-
tation and the attendance of public events, meetings and workshops. 
Interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed in Portuguese and 
Spanish and only the extracts reproduced in this paper were translated 
into English. Before examining the achievements and weaknesses of the 
various responses to climate change – to be honest, still in an embryonic 
stage of development in the UPRB – a review of ideal-type approaches or 
paradigms within contemporary climate debates will be first introduced.
aPProaChes and resPonses to CliMate 
Change
Because of the number of sectors and issues involved, the policy 
arrangements developed for dealing with climate change in any country 
are prone to be complex and multifaceted. Normally, the approaches of 
governments and civil society organisations combine a range of interpre-
tations of climate change scenarios, which are influenced by the specific 
socio-political and ecological circumstances. Therefore, a clear apprecia-
tion of interactions, uncertainty and contested knowledge, as well as the 
interdependency among diverse and unequal interests, is required (Fish 
et al., 2010). Policy responses are not restricted to the economic and legal 
domains, but represent adjustments in a range of social institutions. 
Institutions are here understood as legislation, norms, cognitive frames 
and meaning systems that guide human action and structure social 
interactions (Hall & Soskice, 1996). In sociological terms, institutions 
are “the formative products of an amalgamation of factors, just as they 
themselves can and do influence such factors” (Thynne, 2008, p. 239). 
Institutional responses must be seen as norms that shape action, frame 
identities, affect the realisation of problems and influence decisions 
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and solutions. Such responses are not purely rational or technical, but 
include a range of actions that are culturally determined and constantly 
renegotiated between groups of interest.  
In the context of the climate change debate, O’Riordan & Jordan 
(1999) describe institutions as the multitude of means for holding society 
together. The rationale behind the different reactions to the threats of 
climate change are both informed by the institutional arrangements 
and materialised through modifications in social institutions. Therefore, 
institutional responses go beyond the simple dichotomy between ‘adap-
tation’ and ‘mitigation’, but it is necessary to consider the wider variety 
of interpretations and reactions to climate change (Füssel & Klein, 2006). 
The first approach to be mentioned is the scepticism about the origins 
and possible consequences of climatic change as discussed under the 
UNFCCC. On the one hand, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC] and other international organisations have presented 
compelling data, within the margin of errors of the established scien-
tific methods that indicate the existence of anthropogenic causes behind 
contemporary climate change. For instance, hydrological changes seem 
unequivocal, as well as the reduction in glaciers and in the rate of snow 
cover due to human-made global warming (as included in the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report published in 2013). On the other hand, despite 
of such mounting scientific evidence and concerted international efforts, 
there is still significant scepticism, particularly among radical right-wing 
political groups, about the actual causes of climatic change. 
Climate scepticism refers to a sense of climate ‘denialism’ or ‘con-
trarianism’ that has recently been very much in the media spotlight, 
especially because of the unauthorised publication, November 2009, of 
emails exchanged between scientists that exposed their doubts climate 
change evidence (Nerlich, 2010). Sceptics argue that it is not possible to 
demonstrate, beyond doubt, that the progressive warming of the planet 
does not have natural causes (Poortinga et al., 2011). In practice, climate 
scepticism has been a convenient and prominent institutional response 
to the climate change demands. This argument has been particularly 
useful for lobbyists representing the interests of those sectors that are 
directly responsible for large emissions of GHGs (e.g. oil industry, timber 
producers, energy generation, etc.), particularly after the 2008 global 
financial crisis that has put extra pressure on tight national budgets. It is 
important to realise that, although the number of sceptical scientists and 
opinion-makers is small, their presence in the international discussion 
gives a misleading impression that the debate is evenly split between 
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those that believe and those that dispute the anthropogenic causes of 
climatic change. The perverse result is that climate sceptics have had a 
growing influence on governments unwilling to spend resources and 
political capital on the adjustments required to cope with climate change.
The second approach discussed here includes measures associated 
with market or market-like transactions. In order to achieve the stabilisa-
tion of GHG concentrations, economists have recommended the alloca-
tion of appropriate emission reduction responsibilities among nations or 
administrative units that should be implemented through market-based 
mechanisms (Jepma & Munasinghe, 1998). Such an approach is based on 
the claims that a global optimisation of GHG emissions can only secure 
techno-economic efficiency through market or market-like transactions 
(Bührs, 2010). In theory, the abatement of emissions must be pursued up 
to the level where the margin benefit of reducing emissions of GHGs by 
one additional unit is equal to the marginal cost of curbing such emis-
sions (Davoudpour & Ahadi, 2006). This sort of institutional response 
– that constitutes a main inspiration for public policies and is indeed 
the main driver of the climate change diplomacy nowadays – is directly 
influenced by the application of the neoclassical economic theory to the 
study of environmental degradation (Ioris, 2010). According to envi-
ronmental economists, monetary valuation can guide the choice among 
numerous potential methods of improving the quantity and the reli-
ability of environmental management. For instance, global wetlands are 
redefined as providers of ecosystem services, which can be quantified in 
monetary terms at as much as US$ 20,000 per hectare (Keddy et al., 2009). 
However, it must also be observed that the reduction of wider socio-
economic and environmental processes to a set of independent utility func-
tions has become an important source of criticism levied against environ-
mental economists. Anthoff & Tol (2010) specifically argue that the standard 
calculation of the costs of emissions and impacts is inadequate, because it 
presumes a global welfare function that ignores the differences between 
poor and rich countries. These authors recommend that the national gov-
ernment should value impacts in other regions of the world when com-
puting a social cost of carbon that could be used in domestic cost benefit 
analysis. This sort of methodological adjustment, nonetheless, still fails to 
remove the reductionist basis of environmental economics. Methodologies 
adopted by environmental economists tend to restrict the reaction to cli-
mate change to the narrow determination of economic costs, benefits and 
effects. Economic-centred measures fall short of addressing the mounting 
conflicts and negative impacts associated with the emission of GHGs, as 
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well as the recognition of differential responsibilities. Bromley (1991) sub-
mits that, instead of focusing on the economic use of resources only, the 
solution to environmental problems requires first of all the determination 
of collective standards of performance that can reward individual initiative, 
experimentation and efficiency, as discussed next. 
Another common response – third in our list – that has attracted 
great attention is systematic adaptation based on ’experimentation‘, that 
is, through a constant reassessment of initiatives and results (Arvai et al., 
2006). Systematic adaptation, at the regional and global scales, is posited 
as an interactive process that aims to transform social relations by creating 
new knowledge, networks and partnership among interdependent actors. 
It is described as essentially a form of learning-by-doing, a mechanism by 
which responses are negotiated, implemented and jointly evaluated by 
those involved. The process is often initiated as a result of several factors, 
such as a perceived environmental threat or crisis (e.g. climate change), a 
new regulatory demand or the availability of financial incentives. At this 
point, stakeholders begin to appreciate their interdependence, the need to 
act together and the importance of redesigning social institutions (Gupta et 
al ., 2010). Subsequently, the participating organisations focus on desirable 
future conditions as well as the underlying values, beliefs and principles 
that will guide them towards their joint ambitions and aspirations. This 
tends to be followed by a structuring phase in which specific goals and 
objectives are established, programmes of activities are designed, and roles 
and responsibilities are assigned to the various participating organisations 
and groups (Glaas et al., 2010).
Systematic adaptation (or adaptive management) is essentially part 
of the broader agenda of environmental governance that permeates con-
temporary policy-making (Mitchell & Breen, 2007). Governance repre-
sents a means of describing and analysing new regulatory arrangements 
and institutional configurations whereby roles and responsibilities for 
governing are shared among state-based entities and actors operating 
beyond the boundaries of formal government. Governance, instead 
of conventional government, is described as the pursuit of more flex-
ible strategies and mechanisms of public administration to accomplish 
policy goals, realise values and manage environmental risks and impacts 
(Howlett and Rayner, 2006). It includes different ‘modes of governance’ 
aiming at raising awareness, influencing personal and group behav-
iour and involving social actors in decision-making (Treib et al., 2007). 
Conventional distinctions and boundaries that previously defined state-
market-civil society relations have become blurred as different combi-
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nations of actors have become engaged in the pursue of environmental 
governance and, ultimately, adaptive management (Dengler, 2007; Engle 
and Lemos, 2010). Huitema et al. (2009) even recommend that the theory 
of adaptive management can be even reconceptualised as ‘adaptive co-
management’, which is based on collaboration in a polycentric gover-
nance system. Notwithstanding the appealing discourse, the argument 
of adaptive management (and the related endorsement of environmental 
governance type of solutions) has the serious weakness of diluting the 
accountability for the causes of climatic change and the uneven distri-
bution of impacts. For instance, government initiatives in the UK have 
stimulated a further set of actions at other scales in public agencies, regu-
latory agencies and regional government (and the devolved administra-
tions), though with little real evidence of climate change adaptation ini-
tiatives trickling down to local government level (Tompkins et al., 2010). 
That has seriously undermined the ability of systematic adaptation to 
face the challenging and contested nature of climate change challenges, 
which gives room for the next two institutional responses. 
The fourth main paradigm to be analysed is the architecture of 
entitlements. Most of the responses formulated today by govern-
ments and multilateral organisations have tried to overcome climate 
change scepticism, but have been largely trapped in the narrow 
debate between, on the one side, a management discourse based on 
a technocratic worldview and neo-Malthusian prejudices against 
poor populations, and, on the other side, a populist argument por-
traying local actors as the victims of external interventions (who 
should be somehow incorporated into the formulation of mitiga-
tion approaches) but without much consideration of the historical 
inequalities in the access to resources (Adger et al., 2001). Therefore, 
Adger & Kelly (1999) suggest that responses to climate change should 
follow the lens of entitlements, an approach based on the argument 
that deprived conditions, such as famine, are caused by the lack of 
access to food rather than a lack of food availability (Sen, 1981). The 
line of reasoning is that the extent to which groups and communities 
are entitled to use resources determines their ability to cope with and 
adapt to climatic stress. Consequently, the focus should shift towards 
the determination of entitlements and obligations among the parties 
involved in the use and conservation of natural resources. 
This fourth approach brings attention to how entitlements are 
defined and contested, and also the wider political and socioeconomic 
aspects of environmental management. “The factors which deter-
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mine levels of social vulnerability define how the pattern of access to 
resources is constructed; this construction can be termed the ‘architec-
ture of entitlements’” (Adger and Kelly, 1999, p. 256). Instead of the 
exogenous preferences and costless social contracting claimed by neo-
classical environmental economists, the institutional structure of entitle-
ments (i.e. property or liabilities) directly influences the nature of the 
bargaining process between two or more parties. In spite of the more 
comprehensive understanding of the climate change dilemmas, the for-
mulation of responses based on the theory of entitlements seems still 
to miss the deeper connections between local exchanges and globalised 
scales of interaction. Devereux (2001) directly condemns the architec-
ture of entitlements approach for its methodological individualism and 
its privileging of economic aspects above socio-political determinants. 
Without recognising such associations between local and global politics, 
there is the risk of atomistic and technocratic solutions that normally end 
up falling under the hegemonic influence of environmental economics 
and environmental governance. 
Finally, this schematic review needs to include a fifth institutional 
response to the threats of climate change that is more closely associated 
with grassroots activists and the campaigners of environmental justice. 
The emerging climate justice movement focuses on the politicised inter-
actions between climate change threats and the erosion of social and 
economic rights. Haines & Reichman (2008) argue that fair approaches 
to climate change require understanding the strengths and limitations of 
conventional environmental policy-making. For those authors it is nec-
essary to tease apart the intricacies of international law and governance 
to find ways to turn economic, legal, and cultural norms toward creating 
climate justice. The basic claim is that the creation and funding of inter-
national institutions for adaptation or mitigation to climate change ines-
capably involve questions of justice (Harris and Symons, 2010). Because 
of the perceived discrimination and injustices that are maintained or 
aggravated by the responses to climate change, the global movement on 
climate justice has criticised the ineffectiveness of top-down responses, 
as well as the new spaces for capital accumulation created by the expan-
sion of ‘green capitalism’, that is, the accumulation of capital that ben-
efits from the environmental crisis itself (Dawson, 2010). 
The fairness element of the fifth area of institutional response 
implies that climate change should be related, in a transformative way, 
with the problems of poverty and marginalisation in the South and over-
consumption and fuel dependence in the North. According to such line 
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of argument, the lack of effective responses to the risks posed by climate 
change grew almost inevitably from global inequalities, which has per-
petuated highly inconsistent ways of thinking and dealing with shared 
risks (Parks and Roberts, 2010). Consequently, it is contended by cli-
mate justice authors that the reaction to anthropogenic global warming 
should target human welfare rather than provide compensation to states 
(seen as the primary responsible for unchecked GHG emissions) and 
should be funded through measures that impose similar emission costs 
on affluent people in both developed and developing countries. Also 
inequalities within the same groups reinforce the importance of finding 
common ground between the development and climate justice agendas, 
as well as to reconcile the conflicting messages and objectives of civil 
society (Parks and Roberts, 2010). 
The above overview of the five main approaches or institutional 
responses to the challenges related to climate change – see Table 1 – will 
now inform our examination of the institutional context in the three 
countries that contain the UPRB and the Pantanal in South America.  
Table 1:  Approaches  to Climate Change: A Schematic Overview  
of the Bibliography 
Approach or 
Institutional 
Response
Main reasoning Claims and approaches
Examples of responses and 
policy implications
Climate
scepticism
Denial of the 
anthropogenic 
causes of 
climate change
Major scientific 
uncertainty remaining 
and the disproportionate 
cost of precautionary 
measures
No change in existing 
environmental and economic 
policies; ’wait and see’; 
maintain carbon intensive 
economic development
Marketisation 
measures
Neoclassical 
economics 
principles; 
solutions through 
the market
Assessment of the 
monetary value of 
ecosystem services 
and the costs of GHG 
reduction
Market-based responses; 
carbon trading and carbon 
taxes; adoption of schemes 
such as REDD and other 
forms of payment for 
ecosystem services
Systematic 
adaptation
Continuous 
revaluation of 
initiatives and 
technologies 
Search for better 
environmental 
governance and 
technological 
improvements
Interactive responses; 
tentative initiatives and 
heuristic examination of 
results; constant adjustments 
and improvements
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Architecture 
of 
entitlements
Equity between 
countries, 
groups and 
individuals
Acknowledgement of 
the social construction 
of resource scarcity and 
vulnerability
Clarification of entitlements 
and obligations of all parties 
involved in terms of access 
to natural resources and the 
distribution of impacts
Climate
justice
Criticism 
of unfair 
production and 
distribution 
patterns
Denunciation of the 
exploitation of society 
and the rest of nature
Struggle for a compensation 
for past and present 
inequalities; fulfilment of 
the demands of the more 
vulnerable social groups
assessing aPProaChes to CliMate 
Change in the uPrb
The preceding review of the literature on the approaches and 
responses to the risks posed by anthropogenic climate change should 
help to understand the socio-political context and the institutional 
dilemmas currently affecting the management of the UPRB and the Pan-
tanal region. Our analysis should first recognise that the UPRB does not 
figure very high in the list of climate change priorities of Brazil, Bolivia or 
Paraguay. On the contrary, in those three countries scientists and policy-
makers have mostly concentrated their attention to other biomes (such 
as the Amazon, the Andes and the Chaco, respectively). As observed in 
some of our interviews:
“As a matter of fact, there is no specific legislation for the UPRB [con-
cerning climate change], because the priority has been the Amazon. 
Most national policies are focused on monitoring and deforestation, 
which means that there are no local policies [for the UPRB] either.” (En-
vironmental  regulator, Brazil, Jul 2011)
“I think that the main obstacle is the lack of financial resources, but also 
the difficulty to establish alliances with other organisations due to the 
bureaucracy that characterises public agencies. Also there are no clear 
guidelines to inform the cooperation between organisations and how 
these can help the implementation of existing policies.” (Ecologist, Bo-
livia, Sep 2011)
It means that the institutional framework for dealing with climate 
change in the Pantanal region are mainly the residue of the public poli-
cies primarily intended for some other geographical areas in the three 
countries. That situation represents a considerable ‘policy-making gap’ 
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that, in the end, has tended to undermine the advance of climate change 
policies within each country and between countries. The marginalisation 
of the region in the structures of policy-making also brings us a par-
ticular analytical difficulty, given that the current research had to deal 
with subtle evidences and limited information 
Likewise, it is also important to acknowledge the existence of strong 
elements of climate scepticism in the region, which still permeate many 
development strategies of governments and the stronger socioeconomic 
sectors. Although the ecological value of the Pantanal wetlands and its 
surrounding plateaus are mentioned in official discourses and corporate 
publications, there has been significant hesitation to effectively tackle the 
prospects of climate change in the UPRB. That is clearly demonstrated by 
the delay to organise formal state regulation and to engage civil society 
in the aspects of the public debate that are specific relevant for coping 
with climate change risks.
After recognising the secondary importance of the region for national 
policy-making purposes and the persistence of climate change scepticism, 
it should be possible to analyse the institutional responses actually consid-
ered for the UPRB. Referring back to the literature review in the preceding 
pages, we can verify that the climate change action in the three countries 
has been essentially a hybrid combination of different approaches (hence 
the importance of the description of those five approaches). We can start 
our examination with Brazil, the country that includes most of the Pan-
tanal and the UPRB territory. It is worth remembering, at least in symbolic 
terms, that the signature of the Climate Change Convention happened in 
Brazil during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Two years later, in 
1994, the Convention was ratified by the Brazilian Congress and allowed 
its implementation by the national state. Because of its federal configura-
tion, the reactions to climate change had to be shared between the central 
government and the state (provincial) administrations, as well as by thou-
sands of municipal authorities (Cole, 2009). 
The two states that contain the Brazilian section of the river basin 
(Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul) have followed the example 
of the national government and instituted a preliminary structure of 
policy-making for dealing with climate change, although the approval 
of state legislation has proven controversial. For instance, Mato Grosso 
has a climate change forum since 2009, but the activities have produced 
limited results and serious disagreements led to the departure of some 
key organisations from the forum (such as the Amazon Environmental 
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Research Institute, IPAM, in June 2010, which published an ‘open letter’ 
denouncing the hesitation to effectively face up to the challenges related 
to climate change in Mato Grosso).
Based on our interviews and on the analysis of the documentation, 
it was possible to ascertain that most of the institutional responses for-
mulated in the Brazilian section of the UPRB seem to gravitate around 
systematic adaptation measures, particularly related to new agriculture 
production technologies and the expansion of hydropower energy. Prob-
ably the most relevant element of adaptive management is the improve-
ment of agriculture practices as a strategy to reduce GHG emissions. 
Techniques such as no-tillage, crop rotation and perennial crops have the 
potential to store more carbon in the soil and help to mitigate the risks 
of climate change; at the same time, those practices can also contribute 
to conserve soil and water resources at the catchment level (Tollefson, 
2010). In Mato Grosso do Sul, a new law passed in 2010 (No. 3,951) intro-
duced green certification of products as means to induce carbon capture 
in the soil through new agriculture practices. 
Also in 2010, the federal government launched the programme ‘Low 
Carbon Agriculture’ (ABC), which provides financial incentives for the 
adoption of techniques such as no-tillage, reforestation and cattle-crop-
forest integration. Because of the scale of the agribusiness sector, both 
Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul are important areas for the ABC 
programme and farmers in those states have expressed their satisfac-
tion with the funds already made available by the national government 
(Valor Econômico, 2011). Similar reductions in terms of GHG emissions 
are supposed to be obtained from the operation of additional hydro-
power plants in the UPRB (although in this case localised impacts are 
typically associated with the construction and operation of hydroelectric 
schemes). Historically, most of the electricity generation in Brazil has 
come from hydropower plants, but until lately the UPRB had not been a 
priority area for the construction of energy schemes (Ioris, 2012). 
In addition to those initiatives, the last decade, there has been a 
concerted emphasis in translating environmental economic principles 
into policy-making in Brazil. The main goal is to assess the monetary 
value of the impacts of climate change and formulate financial incen-
tives to reduce the emission of GHGs. That follows what was described 
above as ‘marketisation measures’, that is, the application of solutions 
to environmental problems to foster economic rationality and promote 
management efficiency. In December 2009 a new legislation was passed 
in the country instituting the national policy on climate change, which 
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included, among many other clauses, the creation of the ‘Brazilian emis-
sion reduction market’ (MBRE). This initiative is aimed to manage carbon 
emission trade in the country and is supposed to operate through the 
normal stock market channels. Likewise, the National Climate Change 
Fund (FNMC) was also established in 2009 to raise funds to be applied in 
the concession of loans and in the financial support (non-reimbursable) 
to projects aimed at climate change mitigation and adaptation. The pur-
suit of economic instruments became the new face of the policy-making 
related to climate change in Brazil. For instance, Viglizzo & Frank (2006) 
calculate that the ecosystem services in Pantanal has the highest gross 
annual value of ecosystem services in the Plata Basin (US$ 5,726.9/ha/
year), which would serve as justification for the conversion of such ser-
vices into monetary payments to those involved in their conservation. 
Initiatives related to emission trading have increasingly encouraged the 
production of biofuel, such as ethanol and biodiesel, in the agriculture 
areas the surround the Pantanal. An association of the biofuel Producers 
of Mato Grosso do Sul, known as BioSul, was already organised to rep-
resent the sector at the local and national levels. 
Despite the technological advances achieved under institutional 
responses that follow the rationale of systematic adaptation and mar-
ketisation, it is also important to observe the narrowness of those initia-
tives, especially in terms of the unevenness of the actual beneficiaries. 
Considering together, the above institutional responses to climate change 
in Brazil can be blamed for having followed the same pattern of public 
subsidies being channelled to the stronger and better organised economic 
sectors, at the expense of more inclusive and publicly accessible strategies. 
Not surprisingly, both systematic adaptation and marketisation measures 
were repeatedly criticised in our interviews with by Brazilian academics 
and NGO activists. The main criticism is that technological improvements 
alone are likely to reinforce the same pattern of socioeconomic inequalities 
and concentrated land tenure, which in itself constitutes a serious con-
tradiction in policies that are supposed to deal with a universal problem 
(i.e. the effects of climate change). In addition, there are serious suspicions 
of corruption related to the granting of environmental licences to new 
hydropower schemes, which motivated the creation of a parliamentary 
enquire commission in the state assembly of Mato Grosso in March 2011. 
As pointed out in one interview, the consequences of climate change in 
the region are becoming increasingly evident (although that is yet difficult 
to demonstrate with the scant climatological data available), but it has 
mainly penalised the less well off in society:
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“The most vulnerable populations in the UPRB, like fishermen and col-
lectors are already suffering the negative impacts of climatic changes. 
Extreme events, such as years with serious droughts and also floods 
have really impacted the life of local communities, particularly in terms 
of their infrastructure and social organisation.” (Member of a local 
NGO, Brazil, Jun 2011)
If in Brazilian the institutional responses to climate change have 
largely operated within a technocratic and business-friendly framework, 
the comparable initiatives in Bolivia have followed a different pattern 
under the government of President Evo Morales. Until his election in 
2005, Bolivia used to adhere to the recommendations of the mainstream 
climate change community, essentially in favour of mitigation measures 
influenced by the principles of environmental economics. Similarly 
to the Brazilian experience in the period, the 1990s were a decade of 
intense institutional reform in Bolivia, which attempted to restructure 
the economy along neoliberal lines. Even a few months before the 
unexpected electoral result, the previous national government passed 
a Hydrocarbon Law and other pieces of legislation aimed to regulate 
the activity of national and international private operators, mainly 
interested in exploring the abundant gas reserves of Bolivia. With the 
victory of Morales, however, Bolivia took a more independent, and 
confrontational, attitude regarding the implementation of the Climate 
Change Convention. The main tone of the institutional responses to cli-
mate change under Morales has been the affirmation of the architecture 
of the entitlements, but in a way that realign that architecture to better 
distribute resource entitlements amongst the population according 
to climate justice concerns. In the last few years, the government has 
passed a series of laws that established large reserve areas for the settle-
ment of indigenous groups and poor peasants, which contradicts the 
interests of agribusiness and other dominant economic groups. Further-
more, Bolivia has become a vocal opponent of the dominant framework 
for climate change negotiations, as its diplomatic interventions have 
constantly denounced mainstream climate change negotiations as neo-
colonial practices (De Angelis, 2011). 
In the end, the institutional responses advanced by the Bolivian 
government have increasingly incorporated elements of climate jus-
tice. For example, at the climate change Summit in 2009, the Bolivian 
government joined a coalition of smaller state and non-state actors that 
push for main concessions from the central economic countries. Morales 
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went to COP-15 in Copenhagen and proposed that northern capitalist 
economies should fund mitigation and adaptation mechanisms in other 
countries to pay for their “ecological debt with future generations and 
the rest of the world” (published at www.presidencia.gob.bo/discursos.
php). Bolivia declined to endorse the final agreement and called for an 
alternative summit “to defend Mother Earth, which is under attack from 
the irrational politics of industrialisation of the developed nations.” That 
was named the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the 
Rights of Mother Earth, which took place in Cochabamba in April 2010 
and was attended by around thirty thousand activists from dozens of 
countries. At the end of the conference, the “Agreement of Peoples” on 
Earth Day was signed, which exhorted the major powers to join the 
Kyoto Protocol, called for a global referendum on climate change and 
pushed for the creation of an International Climate Change Court. Later 
in the same year, Morales was one of the most critical voices during the 
COP-16 in Mexico, when Bolivia was the only country that refused to 
sign the Cancun Accord and denounced its vagueness. 
The result is that the Bolivian government has raised a distinct voice 
in the international arena and galvanised the dissatisfaction of tradition-
ally marginalised groups not only in South America, but also around the 
world. Morales derives legitimacy for his autonomous stance on climate 
change partly from his recent re-election in 2009 and partly from the input 
of the Bolivian Platform against Climate Change, a network of over 180 
organised groups. The change of discourse by the national government 
under Morales has had repercussions for the mobilisation and interven-
tion of civil society organisations, which have directly called for a com-
bination of alternative technologies and the fulfilment of civil rights (e.g. 
Centre of Investigation and Peasantry Promotion [CIPCA], 2009). 
Interestingly, despite its confrontational policy, the Bolivian govern-
ment has also paradoxically welcomed initiatives more closely associated 
with the creation of carbon markets and other forms of payments for eco-
system services. In particular, Bolivia is one of the priority countries for 
the implementation of REDD, the UN programme on the Reduction of 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in developing countries. 
The signature of an agreement with REDD by the Morales government 
in September 2010 – it is a pilot project which aims to strengthen institu-
tional capacities and test the REDD framework; the project involves US$ 
4.7 million in financing and support from the World Bank and German 
international cooperation – was inescapably seen by many climate jus-
tice activists as a form of political betrayal to the very political platforms 
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advanced by Morales (Benton-Connell, 2011). Such institutional com-
plexity and apparent inconsistency of the Bolivian responses to climate 
change was mentioned in an interview:
“The main obstacle for dealing with climate change is still the lack of 
political will, and the harmful influence of the business sector. There are 
strong economic interests involved in this whole debate.” (Environmen-
tal NGO activist, Bolivia, Sep 2011).
The situation of Paraguay is at an intermediate position between 
the approaches taken by Brazil and Bolivia in recent years (and prob-
ably closer to marketisation measures than climate justice). Paraguay 
translated the Climate Change Convention into national legislation in 
1993 and in the year 2000 a regulatory system was introduced under 
the coordination of SEAM. Also in 2000 a national GHG inventory was 
published and identified the main emission sectors (despite the limited 
amount of data available). Although the Pantanal wetland only occupies 
a small percentage of the country, most of its economic activity depends 
heavily on navigation along the Paraguay River and the impacts of cli-
mate change are likely to pose a significant threat to the operation of 
international waterways (what was mentioned in various interviews 
and seems to be one of the main areas of concern among Paraguayans). 
Despite those serious consequences of climate change, in practical terms, 
the institutional framework developed so far in Paraguay has proven 
very feeble and inadequate to deal with major politico-economic pres-
sures that insist on the maintenance of conventional forms of production 
and natural resource exploitation. 
At the same time that various initiatives have been advanced in terms of 
alternative agriculture, forestry and energy technologies (Programa de las 
Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo [PNUD], 2007), the agribusiness sector 
continues to expand due to the rising prices of agriculture commodities in 
global markets. Furthermore, the country has most of its electric energy 
generated from hydropower (i.e. the massive Itaipu dam on the border with 
Brazil), but the demand for oil and the high rates of deforestation remain 
a serious challenge in terms of GHG emission reduction. The institutional 
contradictions of the climate change responses formulated in Paraguay are 
demonstrated in the following statement:  
“There is a need to revise and consolidate the institutional approaches 
in the whole river basin [i.e. UPRB]. There is an agency responsible for 
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climate change in Paraguay, but the dissemination of information is very 
poor.  (...) The large agribusiness firms are able to use new technologies 
that help them to cope with climate change, but the small farmers don’t 
have any access.” (Academic, Paraguay, Sep 2011).
It is relevant to mention also that the treaty which established 
MERCOSUL (or MERCOSUR) was signed in Asuncion, Paraguay, in 
1991. MERCOSUL is the new economic block between South American 
countries that intended to eliminate tariff and non-tariff restrictions 
on imports. The agreement included a series of legal instruments on 
environmental regulation and policy-making, which have the primary 
goal of harmonising environmental legislation. One of its administra-
tive units is the Common Market Group (GMC), which passed resolu-
tions on various environmental matters (for example, the Resolution 
9/91 on gas emissions and acceptable levels of pollution). Negotiation 
between member states on environmental issues have in fact repre-
sented an important element of the cross-country cooperation, but have 
also revealed the weaknesses of the MERCOSUL environmental policies 
(Morosini, 2010). 
In addition to the domestic difficulties to coordinate the different 
levels of government and engage the non-governmental sectors in a sus-
tainable management of the Pantanal region, the achievement of genuine 
trans-boundary integration has also proved very problematic. Despite 
a reiterated commitment for cooperation at the high level of South 
American geopolitics, on the ground there have been frequent clashes 
between nation states, such as the increase in the price of the natural gas 
exported from Bolivia to Brazil (through pipelines that cross the Pan-
tanal). Likewise, changes in land use impact the river flow regime and 
has harmful consequences for Paraguay, located downstream of Brazil 
and Bolivia. International negotiators insist on a convergence of insti-
tutional responses, but in practice economic disputes and a weak civil 
society seem to largely undermine the efforts of dealing with climate 
change in the region. 
ConClusion
This brief assessment on the responses to climate change risks in the 
UPRB shows the fragility of the institutional framework that currently 
deals with the conservation and sustainable use of the Pantanal wetland 
and its surrounding, upland areas. The timid measures taken so far to 
deal with the consequences of climate change have clearly reflected 
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hegemonic economic and political influences in the three countries that 
share the river basin, especially form the agribusiness sector. It is pos-
sible to verify that most government initiatives in Brazil and Paraguay 
have combined systematic adaptation (particularly in terms of tech-
nology amelioration) and, more recently, the influence of marketisation 
approaches (e.g. carbon trading and REDD). The Bolivian government 
has tried to implement a more autonomous and critical programme of 
measures associated with climate justice, but the experience has not pre-
vented the adhesion to mainstream initiatives such as the REDD project. 
In addition, the UPRB continues to occupy only a secondary position in 
the national climate change priorities of the three countries and local polit-
ical leaders have been unable to influence the formulation of legislation and 
policies. This situation represents not only a significant obstacle for doing 
social sciences research on climate change responses, but the slow imple-
mentation of those measures in the region also suggests that the Pantanal 
wetland and the UPRB remain relatively marginalised in the formulation of 
environmental policies and even in the environmental diplomacy between 
Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay. The threats of climate change for the UPRB 
have failed to capture the imagination of most environmental policy-maker 
and politicians, while the mobilisation of the private sector has also been 
reluctant or opportunistic. The demand for energy, natural resources and 
commodity production represent major pressure over biological processes 
and have been pursued with little consideration of the needs of the low-
income population and the opinion of grassroots groups. 
The regional experience is a case in point of the inherent limitations 
of the institutional reforms and the contradictory influences of neoclas-
sical economics on the ongoing reorganisation of the environmental 
sector. Instead of promoting a genuine change in public policies, the 
new approaches have largely preserved the hegemonic interests of land-
owners, industrialists, construction companies and real estate investors, 
at the expense of the majority of the population and the recovery of eco-
logical systems. The crux of the matter has been the persistent inability 
of governments and of the representative of the hegemonic sectors to 
formulate more inclusive and sound climate change policies. Central-
ised, conventional approaches have ultimately perpetuated a situation 
of high socio-ecological vulnerability and institutional unpreparedness 
to cope with climate change.
The more recent attitude of the Bolivian government has represented 
a contrasting voice in the international arena, but the same government 
has also accepted other mainstream mechanisms that are based on the 
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monetisation of costs and benefits. At the same time, formal public par-
ticipation forums created in the Brazilian section of the UPRB have been 
a little more than a formality and have not avoided internal political 
friction. The climate change debate in Paraguay is still in its infancy, 
despite the risks posed to the navigation and socio-economy, and the 
country has systematically lagged behind the developments in the other 
two upstream nations. Taking together the current situation in the three 
countries, it is possible to identify only modest sings of institutional 
improvement in the UPRB region and many questions are left unan-
swered. The perverse irony is that climate change in the UPRB seems 
still a very abstract and cumbersome issue, although the severe conse-
quences of global warming may be felt much earlier than most expect. 
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